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Linking corporate reputation and shareholder value using the publication of 
reputation rankings1 
 
Sven Tischer and Lutz Hildebrandt2 
Abstract 
Good corporate reputation is seen as one of the most valuable assets. It is believed 
to cause a multitude of favorable impacts within different stakeholder groups. As a 
consequence, a multitude of studies analyzed the relationship between corporate 
reputation and financial performance. However, the most of them raised the question 
of causation due to their methodology. In order to isolate the impact of corporate 
reputation on financial performance, some authors had conducted event studies, but 
without any success. Therefore, this study provides a comprehensive theoretical 
background, why reputation has to affect financial performance. According to this 
theory, two event studies are conducted to analyze the impact of publishing 
reputation rankings of the German Manager Magazine from 1998 to 2008 on share 
prices. As expected, we find positive or negative announcement effects regarding 
upgraded or respectively downgraded companies. Consequently, investors gain new 
information from the published rankings (increase or decrease in reputation) to adjust 
share prices. 
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1. Introduction 
The major change in management research during the last decades is the 
paradigmatic move from thinking in tangible assets to intangibles (Barney, 1991). It is 
postulated that the intangible assets are the major drivers of sustainable performance 
because these assets cannot be easily neutralized by competitors, are hard to copy 
and in general not tradable via factor markets. As one of these factors, corporate 
reputation has become one of the most discussed (Abimbola & Vallaster, 2007; 
Caruana, 1997; Hunt & Morgan, 1995) and most valuable (Boot et al., 1993; Hall, 
1992) intangibles. The latter point is attributed to the fact that reputation is 
considerably able to defend a competitive position (Jones et al., 2000; Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989) especially by buffering negative critical incidents (Dhir & Vinen, 2005). 
As a consequence we assume that a consistent and strong relationship between 
company reputation and financial performance exists. That implies that a relationship 
should also exist between information contained in corporate reputation rankings and 
financial performance. 
A number of research studies have analyzed this relationship (Anderson & Smith, 
2006; Fornell, Mithas, Morgeson & Krishnan, 2006; Inglis, Morley & Sammut, 2006; 
Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Rose & Thomsen, 2004; Sanchez & Satorrio, 2007; Vergin 
& Qoronfleh, 1998 and), butnone of them were able to confirm, without any doubt, an 
influence of corporate reputation (measures) on financial performance. This is 
because either the analyses could not prove the claimed effects (Inglis et al., 2006; 
Rose & Thomson, 2004) or the direction of causation (see also McGuire, Sundgren & 
Schneeweis,1988; McGuire,  Schneeweis & Branch, 1990; Sabate & Puente, 2003) 
could not definitely determined (Anderson & Smith, 2006; Fornell et al., 2006; 
Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Sanchez & Satorrio, 2007; Vergin & Qoronfleh, 1998). 
In order to isolate the effect of reputation on financial performance, one can look for 
announcement effects of publishing reputation data as Hannon and Milkovich (1996), 
Ittner and Larcker (1998), Fornell, Mithas, Morgeson and Krishnan (2006) as well as 
Abraham, Friedman, Khan and Skolnik (2008) had done. However, these studies 
were unable to validate an impact of reputation announcements on shareholder 
value.  
Therefore, we conduct an event study using a refined methodology and different data 
(reputation rankings). To examine the causal relationship, we investigate whether 
announcing significant positive (negative) changes of corporate reputation measures 
affect shareholder value positively (negatively). In contrast to the previous studies, 
we find a relationship as expected. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we develop the theoretical basis for our 
research by relating corporate reputation and shareholder value. This includes an 
overview of general drivers derived from financial and management theory, followed 
by a closer look at the specific (possible) impact of good reputation on shareholder 
value. After that, the information contained in published reputation rankings is shortly 
discussed and evaluated under the assumption of market efficiency. This is followed 
by a section with a detailed description of the event study methodology, the model 
we estimate and the used sample. Finally, the results are presented and discussed. 
The conclusion highlights the findings and limitations of our research.  
2. Theoretical basis 
2.1. The concept of corporate reputation 
As a result of interdisciplinary initiated and driven research on corporate reputation 
and different perspectives ranging from psychology to management, a host of 
different concepts of reputation exist. Consequently, the need for a precise definition 
has long been claimed by Fombrun (1996) and Wartick (2002). 
To date, it is broadly accepted that reputation is a collective construct which reflects 
an aggregated view of individual perceptions (Barnett, Jermier & Lafferty, 2006; 
Walker, 2010; Wartick, 1992). According to Bromley (2002a), the collective is a 
relatively homogeneous group of people who partially share common interests in a 
reputational entity. Additionally, there is a general agreement that corporate 
reputation measurements have to be focused on the relevant stakeholders 
(Boulstridge & Carrigan, 2000). Concerning measurement approaches, a distinction 
can be made between taking an overall perspective (Fombrun, 1996), including 
internal and external stakeholders; a stakeholder group-specific perspective 
(Bromley, 2002a); an issue-specific perspective, within different groups of 
stakeholders; and an overall issue-specific perspective (Walker, 2010). The question 
is not whether there are perceived differences between multiple stakeholder groups 
as shown in Figure 1 but rather to which extend.  
 
Figure 1: Key elements of corporate reputation and the corresponding information gaps   
(following Chun, 2005) 
 
The Relational School (Chun, 2005) addresses this question by comparing the 
multiple stakeholder views. Based on information asymmetry between internal 
(insiders) and external stakeholders (outsiders), the perceptional gap between them 
should be most evident. Considering even the smaller differences between the 
groups within these two distinct groups, we define corporate reputation as: 
A relatively stable, aggregated and indirectly suggestible perception within 
multiple stakeholder groups based on a company’s past actions and future 
prospects in comparison to some reference. 
In contrast to Walker’s (2010) perspective, the issue-specific term is excluded due to 
the assumption that corporate reputation represents a simplified collective 
assessment. This assumption is supported by findings on the existence of halo-
effects (Brown & Perry, 1994; Schultz, Mouritsen & Gabrielsen, 2001). However, our 
definition does not mean that an overall aggregation as stated by Fombrun (1996) is 
not acceptable. It emphasizes just the allowance of and not the need for variety in 
general. Indeed, the absence of such a variety could be attributed to considerations 
that an unfavorable reputation might contaminate a favorable one (Carter & 
Deephouse, 1999) or vice versa. Furthermore, the empirical findings of Eberl and 
Schwaiger (2005) support the idea that corporate reputation between various 
stakeholder groups can be comparable. Attributed to these theoretical approaches 
and empirical findings, we assume that corporate reputation within one stakeholder 
group is in general an indication for the others. 
2.2. Shareholder Value  
Taking a financial perspective, the economic value of a company is the sum of its 
debts and its equity. In the case of a publicly traded corporation, the value of equity 
portion is called shareholder value. According to Rappaport (1998), shareholder 
value is defined as the difference between the corporate value and its debts, 
whereas the corporate value reflects the present value of cash flows (CF) generated 
by firm’s operations during the forecast period and the residual value (R) afterwards. 
Both cash flows and the residual value are uncertain expectations, which have to be 
estimated taking into account different states, their related probabilities and cash 
flows. An often proposed risk adjusted discount rate (r) of these expectations is the 
weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) regarding a target capital structure 
(Rappaport, 1998). Thus, shareholder value (SV) is defined as:  
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By dividing this resulting amount (SV) by the total number of issued shares, we will 
obtain the price per share. Using this model, share prices may be driven by financial 
decisions like share repurchase programs (Grullon & Michaely, 2004; Stephen & 
Weisbach, 1998), issues of new shares (Barclay & Litzenberger, 1988) or changes in 
the capital structure (Masulis, 1980, 1983). Hence, it is essential for valid research to 
exclude such causes by assuming or rather checking that neither the number of 
issued shares nor the capital structure (debts) changes during an observation period. 
Taking that into account, three potential drivers of shareholder value are remaining.  
First, the cash flows (CF) can be affected as illustrated in Figure 2. The cash flows 
can be both enhanced and accelerated. Accelerating cash flows increases the 
present value as a result of being less discounted, which is attributed to time and risk 
adjustments. 
Second, changes of the discount rate (r) will have an impact. Given that this interest 
rate has to compensate risks borne by debt holders and shareholders, a risk 
reduction would minimize the capital costs (1+r). Consequently, the present value 
would shift in favor of the shareholders. In addition to accelerating cash flows, a risk 
reduction may be achieved by declining volatility and vulnerability of cash flows. 
The third remaining opportunity is to enhance the residual value (R). However, all 
drivers have in common the fact that they are, solely or in sum, just a sufficient 
condition for affecting shareholder value. 
Figure 2: Drivers of shareholder value, cash flows and risk (following Srivastava et al. 1998) 
 
The necessary condition for an actual change is the demand of some investors, who 
are willing to purchase shares at a higher price than recently traded based on future 
expectations. After taking a glimpse at the individual potential drivers, the relationship 
between corporate reputation and these drivers is explained in the following chapter.  
2.3. How does reputation affect shareholder value? 
As stated by Barney (1991), a favorable corporate reputation can improve the 
competitive situation by positively influencing different stakeholder groups. However, 
this effect is claimed by some researchers to be the other way around (for an 
overview see Sabate & Puente, 2003). Within the scope of this paper, we are 
focusing on corporate reputation as being the trigger. There are some studies which 
were able to support this view by showing positive effects of favorable reputation on 
financial performance (Dunbar & Schwalbach, 2000; Eberl & Schwaiger, 2005; 
Srivastava, McInish, Wood & Capraro, 1997a). Building on our perspective on 
financial drivers, we differentiate stakeholder specific effects. 
According to first financial driver, cash flows (CF) could be higher as well as 
accelerated by an earlier entry of stakeholders into a relationship with a company. 
Puncheva (2008) proposed and examined a signaling based framework where 
corporate reputation had a large influence in such a decision-making process. 
Reputation serves as a signal (Sabate & Puente, 2003; Spence, 1974) and filter for 
all individuals without direct experience with an organization (Kazoleas, Kim & Moffitt, 
2001). In the same line, Kotha, Rajgopal and Rindova (2001) consider a good 
corporate reputation as a risk-reducing mechanism for customers. A comprehensive 
overview of recent studies on the informational, risk reduction value and other forces 
of reputation is given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Mediating drivers, cash flow (external stakeholder)  
Stakeholder Good corporate reputation… References 
Customer: Is used as a risk-reduction mechanism Goldberg & Hartwick, 1990;  
Kotha et al., 2001; Lafferty & 
Goldsmith, 1999 
 Influences buying intentions Yoon et al., 1993 
 Leads to higher product prices Deephouse, 2000; Klein & Leffler, 
1981; Landon & Smith, 1997; 
Podolny, 1993; Rindova et al., 
2005; Shapiro, 1983;  
 Increases repurchase Shapiro, 1983 
Supplier: Reduces transaction costs Bromley, 2002b; Kotha et al., 2001; 
Williamson, 1985 
 Attracts better suppliers and increases 
their loyalty 
Podolny, 1993 
 May reduce contracting and monitoring 
costs 
Roberts & Dowling, 2002 
 Can lead to an anticipation of a long 
term relationship 
Groenland, 2002 
Investors: Enables easy access to more capital 
with less effort 
Dhir & Vinen, 2005; 
Schwalbach, 2000 
 
Almost all of the discovered effects can be attributed to the signal function of 
corporate reputation resulting from the lack of knowledge. Only increasing 
repurchases and higher product prices, as referred to by Shapiro (1983), are due to 
individual acceptance of and identification with an organization as a result of actual 
positive experiences. With the exception of attracting top employees, the latter 
statement fits as well for the mediating cash flow drivers of internal stakeholders (e.g. 
employees, see Table 2). All of them have in common that they are minimizing the 
costs and consequently the out flowing cash. 
Table 2: Mediating drivers, cash flow (internal stakeholder) 
Stakeholder Good corporate reputation… References 
Employees: Indicates a company’s ability to attract 
top employees 
Turban & Greening, 1997; 
Winkleman, 1999 
 Leads to more loyal behavior Fombrun, 1996 
 Reduces personnel fluctuation Caminiti, 1992; Dowling, 1986; 
Eidson & Master, 2000; Nakra, 
2000; Preece et al., 1995; Roberts 
& Dowling, 2002; Winkleman, 1999  
 Increases morale & productivity Turban & Cable, 2003 
 
Related to the second driver, the discount rate (r), investors are in the center of 
attention. They are used to assess companies on the basis of their economic risks. 
Here corporate reputation may signal a lower probability of becoming insolvent or 
bankrupt. This lower risk perception can be the result of profitability (Dowling, 2006) 
derived from the positive cash flow drivers and less sales variance (Srivastava et al., 
1997b; Dowling, 2006). Both reasons are substantially attributed to a stable customer 
base as with the residual value drivers specified below. Additionally, Dowling (2006) 
suggested the credit rating as a cause of risk reduction. Finally, lower borrowing 
costs reduce the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) or rather the discount 
rate. 
Table 3: Mediating drivers, cost of capital (all stakeholders) 
Stakeholder Good corporate reputation… References 
Investors: Reduces costs of capital Beatty & Ritter, 1986 
 Leads to as less risky perceived 
investments 
Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001; 
Srivastava et al., 1997a 
 
Influences the investment decision 
positive 
Little & Little, 2000; Lucey & 
Dowling, 2005; McGregor et al., 
2000; Shefrin, 2001; 
 
Furthermore, in the case of good reputation and an intended brand extension, 
Dowling (2006) stated the opportunity of leveraging revenues related to growth. From 
a different perspective, this can be interpreted as a reduction in risk as well as being 
based on a loyal and stable customer base. The customer base is assigned to the 
third shareholder value driver - residual value. This loyal base is generated and 
growing by satisfied customers. Both Aaker (1991) and Grewal, Krishnan, Baker and 
Borin (1998) pointed out that a good reputation enhances perceived quality and 
consequently satisfaction. But the following mediation drivers of residual value also 
influence both cash flow and discount rate drivers. For example, high customer 
loyalty reduces sensitivity to price rises and the effect of special offers by competitors 
(Hallowell, 1996). On the one hand this causes higher cash flows (CF) and on the 
other hand it reduces risks (r) by lowering the vulnerability of cash flows. 
Table 4: Mediating drivers, residual value (all stakeholders) 
Stakeholder Good corporate reputation… References 
Customer: Enhances perception of quality Grewal et al., 1998 
 Leads to higher post-purchase and post-
use satisfaction 
Aaker, 1991;  
Lafferty & Goldsmith, 1999 
 Increases loyalty Lafferty & Goldsmith, 1999;  
Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001 
 Leads to higher customer retention Caminiti, 1992; Landon & Smith, 
1997; Preece et al., 1995; Selnes, 
1993 
 Enlarges customer basis, fewer leave 
and more arrive 
Rogerson, 1983 
 
If we follow the presented framework then a good reputation will affect the 
shareholder value. Anderson and Smith (2006) as well as Freiesleben (2006) have 
indirectly proven the relationship by showing a positive effect of good corporate 
reputation on pricing. Furthermore, Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (2001) worked out that 
investors were willing to pay higher prices even if reputation (“dotcom effect”) did not 
influence firm profitability.  
But if we take this impact as accepted in general, the next question which comes to 
mind is how corporate reputation is reflected in share prices. We will address this in 
the next section. 
2.4. How do share prices reflect the status of companies’ reputations? 
Based on Fama’s (1970, 1991) classification of market efficiency, we assume a semi-
strong market efficiency, which means that all public information are “fully” reflected 
by share prices. Nevertheless, there are still two different perspectives remaining on 
how reputation has been reflected.  
The first perspective is that share prices “fully” reflect corporate reputation 
continually. This approach is based on the assumptions that market participants can 
observe every positive or negative event which influences reputation, are able to 
adjust their expectations appropriately and take part in setting prices. However, in 
spite of assuming a perfect capital market, there is no need for homogeneous 
expectations of all market participants to drive prices. It will be sufficient in the 
process if some investors who are solvent enough gain the same expectation 
(Seeger, 1998). As a consequence, share prices are always adjusted.  
Nevertheless, due to the characteristics of corporate reputation, it is doubtful that 
market participants are able to set appropriate prices. That is because, on the one 
hand, collective opinions and perceptions of stakeholders who are not invested are 
not public information. On the other hand, corporate reputation is only informative in 
comparison to the perception of competitors.  
Consequently, the second perspective is that corporate reputation has to be explicitly 
published to be “fully” reflected in share prices. A publication of quantified reputation 
rankings seems to be the best way to obtain information about the actual reputation. 
Following Fornell et al. (2006) or rather Ittner and Larcker (2003), this perspective 
can additionally be justified by high expenses for investors which would result from 
individually conducted surveys as well as the use of a sophisticated measurement 
technology. As a consequence, due to exceeding or falling below the expectations of 
market participants, a ranking publication can lead to a strong market reaction. This 
reaction would be in compliance with findings from the publication of other significant 
variables like revenues or earnings (Landsman & Maydew, 2002; Cornell & 
Landsman, 1989; Aharony & Swary, 1980). Based on the second perspective, the 
following question arises to be studied. 
2.5. How to measure the effect of publishing reputation rankings on share prices? 
This question can be analyzed following two distinct lines of approach. On the one 
hand, one could look for a relationship between companies which were awarded 
within a reputation ranking and their financial performance in the long run. In this 
case, both analyses which could (Anderson & Smith 2006; Fornell et al., 2006; 
Roberts & Dowling, 2002;  Sanchez & Satorrio, 2007; Vergin & Qoronfleh, 1998) and 
which could not (Inglis et al., 2006; Rose & Thomsen, 2004) verify the linkages exist. 
On the other hand, one could look for significant short term response generated by 
the announcement. In this case, the causal relationship would be more evident. A 
directly observable effect results from the announcement of quantified reputation 
measures. In contrast to the first line of approach, the empirical findings on 
announcement effects are unambiguous to date. Despite various subjects of 
examination (see Chapter 6), the assessments of Hannon and Milkovich (1996), 
Fornell et al. (2006) and Abraham et al. (2008) could not validate an effect. The 
authors of these studies justified consistently the absence of an announcement effect 
by existing market efficiency as explained in the previous chapter as option one 
(Abraham et al., 2008; Fornell et al., 1996; Hannon & Milkovich, 1996). That is, the 
ranking in its aggregated form “fully” reflects all historical events and knowledge as 
well as the share price. In short, publication of the ranking offered no new information 
for  possible investors.  
Assuming that the previously presented theory of adjusting expectations and 
consequently share prices as result of adapting publicized reputation data is more 
likely, we conduct the study below. 
3. Methodology 
The objective of our event study is to examine whether announcing a considerable 
change in reputation causes a significant increase or decrease in share prices. We 
assume the existence of efficient capital markets, no confounding events and 
unanticipated information until the day of announcement for the estimation and the 
specification of the event window. The smallest event window includes just the day of 
publication with    . But, this window is usually specified larger to encompass also 
possible effects before and after the public announcement which could be caused by 
the information. Following Fama (1970, 1991) and McWilliams and Siegel (1997), all 
the used event windows fulfill sufficiently assumed semi-strong information efficiency. 
The largest event window includes three days - the event day, the day before and the 
day after. The previous day (  (  )) should usually cover share trades which could 
be based on a leakage of information (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). In contrast, the 
day after (  (  )) should take into account both delayed reactions rather than 
reactions of early followers and the fact that information can be obtained by market 
participants after the stock market closes. In general the event window is defined as 
       to    (MacKinlay, 1997). The windows should not overlap to avoid an 
influence on estimators through returns around the event. Hence, the estimation 
window is defined as        to    (MacKinlay, 1997).  
Figure 3: Time line for an event study (MacKinlay, 1997) 
 
Estimation window Event window Post-event window 
T0 T1 T2 T3 0 
Figure 3 illustrates the timing sequence including the post-event window to obtain a 
general overview. Four different event windows are examined. The first window 
covers just the event day, whereas the second one includes additionally the day after 
the announcement. The third and fourth examined windows start one day prior to the 
disclosure. The fourth one is the largest examined event window which includes the 
day afterwards as well. Consequently, depending on the size of the event window, 
the estimating period of the four mentioned windows ends in    (  ) or in    
(  ) as shown in Figure 4.  
Figure 4: The four examined event windows 
 
To validate our results, another larger window is calculated to check whether the 
portfolios are more uniformly performing beyond the maximum period of three days. 
This window is spanned from three days prior to three days after the publication. The 
length of the estimation window is set to 150 trading days in all variations.  
The financial effects are indicated by abnormal returns      . Returns are indexed in 
time and in companies using   and  . The analytical course including the equations 
follows the study of MacKinlay (1997). The abnormal returns are defined as the 
difference between the actual ex-post returns      and the “normal” returns  (    |  ) 
as shown in the following equation: 
(2)              (    |  ) assuming that  (    |  )  (     
 ). 
   symbolizes the condition that the “normal” return is the ex-ante expected return 
without anticipating the event at    . The “normal” returns are estimated with a 
linear regression based on the actual ex-post returns for the whole period beginning 
at      and ending at   . Actual ex-post returns could be calculated on the basis of 
both discrete and continuously compounded returns. If the price of a security is 
declared as      at time  , then discrete returns and logarithmic returns are defined as 
presented in the equations below. 
1. Variation 2. Variation 
 0 T1 T2 0 = T2 T1 
0 T1 T1 
3. Variation 4. Variation 
0 = T2 T2 
(3)       
    
      
   
(4)         (      )    (
    
      
)    (    )    (      ) 
Defining the continuously compounded returns as     , we assume normally 
distributed logarithmic returns during the analysis which means that the discrete 
returns are log-normally distributed (see equation 4). Thus, 
(5)        (     
 )   
(6)   (    )   
   
  
 
    and 
(7)     (    )   
      
 
(   
 
  )  
However, this is in contrast to the classical assumption of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) from Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) as shown in 
equation (8), which assumes discrete returns to be normally distributed. But there are 
two advantageous points in doing so. On the one hand, log-normally distributed 
discrete returns are limited to -1 resulting in a minimum gross return (      ) of zero 
and consequently a maximum loss of 100%. On the other hand, logarithmic returns 
can be easily summed up over multiple periods.  
(8)              (         ) 
     corresponds to the risk free rate of return and      to the return of the market. 
The difference between both is known as risk premium. Due to the fact that both 
market return and riskless return are not observable, approximating indices will be 
used. The procedures of computing corresponding returns are analogous to security 
prices. Therefore, we assume:  
(9)        (     
 ) and       (     
 ). 
Transforming equation (8) to the empirical Sharpe-Lintner equilibrium, which we used 
to estimate the    parameters, shows that individual risk premium equals risk 
premium times   :  
(10)              (         )      . 
For the validity of this equation it will be assumed that: 
(11)   (    )   ,  
 (    )     
  and    (     )    for     
as well as stationary of parameters    (Seyhun, 1986, Seeger, 1998). After using the 
Sharpe-Lintner equilibrium to estimate the   parameters, the next steps to calculate 
average abnormal returns are as stated below. 
(12)             (      ̂ [         ]) 
(13)     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
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After adding up the abnormal returns of all companies on a given day, finally the 
calculation of the cumulative average abnormal return    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     ) follows with a 
defined event window of    to    and 2211   : 




Depending on whether a portfolio of positive announcements, related to an increase 
of reputation, or a portfolio of negative announcements the corresponding null 
hypotheses to be tested are: 
(15)    
        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     )    and   
        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     )   . 
The resulting alternative hypotheses are: 
(16)    
        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     )    and   
        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     )   . 
Following the null hypotheses and the related assumption that the investigated 
events do not influence the expected value or the variance, a normal distribution of 
      will be supposed and Students t-test could be applied in the following form:  
(17)    
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     )
√ ̂ (   (     )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
   (   ). 
The data for this analysis and its related adjustments are presented in the following 
section. 
4. Sample 
The required sample to analyze the announcement effect of reputation rankings 
consists of quantified corporate reputation data and price data of the corresponding 
stocks and indices.  
In the case of reputation data, we take advantage of the rankings from the German 
periodical Manager Magazin.3 Manager Magazin published reputation rankings 
during 1992-2008 in a two-year cycle. Rankings are used from 1998 to 2008 because 
in 1998 the measurement model was changed.4 According to Manager Magazin, 
within the ten-year time span a sample of 2,500 representatively chosen senior 
executives were surveyed by phone for every published ranking. These respondents 
were randomly chosen out of a pool of almost 500,000 executives from 17 different 
sectors and various types of companies. The interviews took place over a one-month 
period between August and October of the previous year. In this process, every 
expert had to assess around 40 companies regarding their reputation. The 
assessment was done on an aggregated level using an eleven-point rating scale 
from 0 (very bad) to 10 (very good). Using these ratings, the mean values of all 
companies were calculated and presented in a descending order in the ranking. In 
addition to that, all jurors were always asked for their opinion what the key 
characteristics of corporate reputation are.  
Table 5: Key characteristics of corporate reputation (Manager Magazin) 
Year 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Customer orientation u. 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Product and service quality u. 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Quality of management 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Innovativeness 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 
Price-performance ratio 1 4 6 5 5 5 u. 
Communication services 6 7 5 6 6 6 u. 
Employee orientation 5 6 7 7 7 7 u. 
Financial power 3 8 8 8 8 8 u. 
Attractiveness for managers 9 11 10 9 9 9 u. 
Internationalization u. 10 9 10 10 10 u. 
Environmental responsibility 7 9 12 11 12 12 u. 
Growth dynamic 8 12 11 12 11 11 u. 
Note: graded by frequency of occurrence (u. - undisclosed) 
                                                            
3  The distribution range per issue is approximately 688,000 readers and includes 69% of executives and 
managers in Germany (Media Spiegel, Feb. 2009, http://www.spiegelgruppe-nachdrucke.de/internet/mediaeng.nsf)  
4  Furthermore, one could see a major change in response of what was deemed to be relevant for corporate 
reputation before 1998 (see table 5). 
The responses, listed and graded in accordance to the frequency of occurrence in 
Table 5, are quite stable within the period under investigation.  
Based on detailed results from 2006, this rank order is highly correlated with the 
influence of these factors. Because of analyzing announcement effects in connection 
with quantified changes in corporate reputation, five testable events result from the 
six rankings.  
During the years 2000 to 2008, the reputation rankings were published by an official 
awarding, via internet and in the press. The simultaneous publication via internet and 
press followed the awarding by several days. We conducted internet research to 
specify the day of official awarding, which we used as event day (   ). This 
research was extended to check for firm specific confounding events such as 
announcements of future capital actions (Barclay & Litzenberger, 1988; Grullon & 
Michaely, 2004; Masulis, 1980, 1983; Stephen & Weisbach, 1998), modifications of 
dividend policy (Aharony & Swary, 1980) or relevant accounting figures (Landsman & 
Maydew, 2002) during all examined event windows.  
On the basis of the six reputation rankings, which contain 856 assessments, the 
sample is first adjusted to contain just the German enterprises. The decisions are 
based on the location of the corporate headquarters. In the course of further 
adjustments, not listed companies, companies for which confounding events are 
identified and illiquid securities are excluded. We categorized an asset as illiquid if 
the shares were not traded on more than one trading day during the period of 
interest. These illiquid securities have to be rejected because these securities could 
react strongly, even at a small trading volume, which could lead to biased results. 
The rejection of these securities is also important because of their heavy violation of 
the assumption of a perfect capital market, which includes that all assets are tradable 
anytime. For the remaining companies, the percentage deviation is calculated using 
their respective reputation score and the arithmetic average of all initially included 
companies within the corresponding year. The overall average corresponds to one 
hundred percent. The comparison of relative values is preferable due to fluctuating 
overall averages within the six rankings (see Table 6).5 
 
                                                            
5
  The mean value of all ratings regarding the company is calculated and rounded to two decimal places. This 
result is multiplied by 100. Consequently, the maximum score is 1000. 
Table 6: Distribution of reputation measures (Manager Magazin) 
Year 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Best 851 853 864 882 910 893 
 
… … … … … … 
Mean 650 649 644 644 657 668 
 
… … … … … … 
Worst 482 457 356* 428 494 491 
* Outlier, not listed, restructured and partly sold after a scandal, next rank 418   
The fluctuating effects could be attributable to a more positive or negative general 
perception caused by a strong economy as opposed to a recession. Consequently, 
these effects could bias both the selection and the results. After comparing the 
calculated percentage deviations of two consecutive rankings, all companies were 
excluded where the corresponding difference between these relative positions is 
smaller than 4%. This threshold value is based on the statement in Manager Magazin 
that a difference of corporate reputation is only perceivable if the reputation measure 
differs by at least 15 points. According to the goal of this study to examine the 
announcement effect of changes in quantified corporate reputation published via 
ranking, the final sample should include only perceivable changes. This condition is 
fulfilled by a threshold of 4%, even for the weakest listed companies (see Table 6).  
The remaining 93 changes in reputation measures are split into two portfolios. One 
portfolio contains the upgrades whereas the other one contains the downgrades. A 
final adjustment of the sample is based on the assumption of the used CAPM - that 
the β parameter should reflect the company specific risk in comparison to the market 
return. But some β parameter estimators were not significant at a significance level of 
0,01 (p-value). Consequently, they were excluded and 88 remaining changes of 
reputation included 41 upgrades and 47 downgrades6. 
The required price data of shares and indices are extracted from the financial 
database Datastream. To calculate the logarithmic returns of shares according to 
Equation 6, the adjusted and unpadded share prices7 are used as     . These prices 
on Datastream are the official closing prices from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
(FWB®) which are adjusted for subsequent capital actions.  
                                                            
6 For an overview of the final sample see appendix. 
7  Datatype (P#T) 
As approximation of market returns      is the CDAX
® used. This index contains all 
German shares which are listed in the General Standard and Prime Standard on the 
FWB® and measures the performance of the entire German equities market. As 
approximation of riskless returns     , the REX
® is used. This weighted index is a 
representative sample of the German government bond market. The index is 
calculated on the basis of 30 domestic bonds and considers various times to maturity 
(one to ten years) as well as three interest rates.8 The CDAX® and the REX® are both 
computed by Deutsche Börse and listed twice on FWB®. In both cases the price 
indices adjusted for capital changes are used in this study. 
 
5. Results  
The average abnormal returns   ̅̅ ̅̅   as well as the accumulation of them 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     ) are presented below, shown as percentages. The corresponding p-values 
are determined for one-tailed t-tests. In both samples, the cumulated average returns 
are as expected. The positive announcements regarding a significant increase of 
corporate reputation induce positive    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     ).  
Table 7: Empirical results, upgraded companies  
 
Upgraded (n = 41) 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     - - - - 0.268 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     - - - - 0.451 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     - - 1.063 1.063 1.083 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     0.383 0.383 0.386 0.386 0.490 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     - -0.265 - -0.272 -0.419 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     - - - - -0.001 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     - - - - 0.222 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     ) 0.383 0.118 1.449 1.177 2.094 
t-value 1.435 0.313 3.859 2.559 * 
p-value 0.079 0.378 0.000 0.006 * 
* Control window, not tested due to violating the assumptions of efficient capital markets   
In contrast, the releases of a decreasing reputation induce negative cumulated 
average returns. However, the effects are not significant for all event windows. It is 
striking that the    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     ) regarding the positive announcements are significant in 
                                                            
8  CDAX®: Performance index (ISIN: DE0008469115) and  Price index (ISIN: DE0008469107) 
 REX®: Performance index (ISIN: DE0008469602) and Price index (ISIN: DE0008469800) 
 
three out of four cases, whereas the negative announcements are only significant in 
the smallest event window (   ). Furthermore, it was unexpected that in both 
samples on the day following the event (  (  )), the sign of   ̅̅ ̅̅   is opposite to that 
of the event day itself (   ). It can be supposed that this effect signals that these 
companies are temporarily less or more risky for investors, depending on whether 
they are up- or downgraded respectively. This would be in line with findings on the 
post-earnings-announcement drift of Bernard and Thomas (1989).   
Table 8: Empirical results, downgraded companies 
 
Downgraded (n = 47) 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     - - - - 0.279 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     - - - - 0.347 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     - - 0.386 0.386 0.380 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     -0.773 -0.773 -0.772 -0.772 -0.802 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     - 0.297 - 0.293 0.334 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     - - - - 0.315 
  ̅̅ ̅̅     - - - - 0.177 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     ) -0.773 -0.477 -0.386 -0.093 1.030 
t-value -2.745 -1.196 -0.971 -0.191 * 
p-value 0.004 0.117 0.167 0.424 * 
* Control window, not tested due to violating the assumptions of efficient capital markets   
The overall adjusted    of the parameter estimations is 0.341. Due to the clear 
differences between the    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     ) of both samples, significance of these 
differences is tested additionally. Considering the different sample sizes as well as 
the possibly different variances, we run Welch’s t-test (Sawilowsky, 2002). The 
results of using a two-tailed t-test are reported in Table 9, which shows that the 
differences are only significant for two event windows: the event day itself (  ) and 
the window including additionally the day before (         ).  
Table 9: Results of Welch’s t-test  
 
                                  
Delta* 1.156 0.595 1.835 1.270 
t-value 2.415 1.042 2.302 1.598 
p-value 0.018 0.301 0.024 0.114 
*    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     )
            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     )
            
As a result, the impact of the announcement is once again confirmed at the event 
day. Furthermore, the second significant difference (         ) indicates, combined 
with the results of Table 7, 8 and Figure 5, a leakage of information prior to the public 
announcements. Apart from that, the calculation of exceeding returns for the control 
window shows that the returns of the two distinct portfolios are more in balance 
beyond the examined event windows (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Control window 
 
These results show that as a consequence to the publishing of reputation rankings, 
investors significantly changed their willingness to buy, which is indicated by rising or 
falling share prices around the announcement. However, not all effects are 
significant, which emphasizes the importance of the event window specification. But 
the impact at the event day is proven without a doubt.  
To make the results more comparable to the study of Fornell et al. (2006), some 
portfolio studies are conducted. The portfolios are created at the event day (   ) 
and kept stable until the next publication. Every portfolio contains the selected up- 
and downgraded companies of the rankings as tested before. The cumulative 
portfolio returns are plotted against the index (CDAX®)9 below. We have deliberately 
not adopted the aggregated presentation of Fornell et al. (2006) because of two 
reasons. On the one hand, the results are more detailed and hence the effects do not 
overlap. On the other hand, the rankings which we used were only publicized in a two 
year cycle. In contrast to Fornell et al. (2006), the downgraded companies are 
presented as well.  
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Figure 6: Cumulative returns, selected companies ranked in 2000  
 
Figure 7: Cumulative returns, selected companies ranked in 2002 
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Figure 9: Cumulative returns, selected companies ranked in 2006 
 
Figure 10: Cumulative returns, selected companies ranked in 2008 
 
These diagrams illustrate two things. First, the final cumulated portfolio return 
depends on the date of portfolio creation. Second, the influence of corporate 
reputation on share prices is overlapped by other factors in the long run.  
 
6. Discussion 
The present analysis demonstrates two distinct things based on the used data. On 
the one hand, publications of reputation rankings have an impact on shareholder 
value. We find, as expected, a positive announcement effect if the relative ranking 
position had been significantly improved and a negative effect if the relative position 
had been deteriorated in comparison to the competitors. 
On the other hand, neither good or bad reputation scores in a ranking, nor their 
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Both results are in line with our earlier argumentation. The announcement effect 
clearly indicates that corporate reputation is information which is not public. As a 
consequence, corporate reputation has to be disclosed. However, once published, 
the information are quick “fully” reflected in share prices. Therefore, we could show 
that the announcement effect is significant at the day of publication and limited to a 
small event window. This confirms the assumed market efficiency and the resulting 
specification of the short event windows. 
Furthermore, the assumption of efficient capital markets is also supported by the 
results of our portfolio studies. As we have shown, the information is dominated by 
other factors in the long run. Consequently, it is impossible to generate excess 
returns based on these reputation signals in the long run. 
However, our findings contradict the empirical results of previous studies of Hannon 
and Milkovich (1996), Ittner and Larcker (1998), Anderson and Smith (2006), Fornell 
et al. (2006) and Abraham et al. (2008). In order to clarify the underlying causes for 
these contradictions we take a closer look at the similarities and differences between 
data and methodologies in the following. 
When hunting for announcement effects of published reputation rankings, Hannon 
and Milkovich (1996) use the disclosure of six different American human resource 
rankings; Fornell et al. (2006) use the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) 
data and Abraham et al. (2008) use the publication of the Reputation Quotient (RQ, 
see Fombrun et al., 2000)10. All these American rankings had been published in the 
“popular business press” (Hannon & Milkovich, 1996) and to some extend via internet 
additionally. This publication process corresponds to the process of the rankings we 
used except for the market under consideration. 
Apart from Hannon and Milkovich’s study which analysed the publication of rankings 
between 1982 to 1989, the periods of interest of Fornell et al. (2006), 1999 to 2002, 
Abraham et al. (2008), 2001-2005, do overlap with our data. However, there are 
considerable differences in the ranking publication cycles. Solely, the ranking Most 
Preferred used by Hannon and Molkovich (1996) had been published in a two-year 
cycle like the ranking of the Manager Magazin we used. In contrast, the ACSI data 
used by Fornell et al. (2006) have been published quarterly, the RQ (Abraham et al., 
                                                            
10 We excluded the study of Ittner and Larcker (1998) in the discussion due to the fact that Fornell et al. (2006) 
used publications of the same ranking. Fornell et al. (2006) analysed just more recent announcements and had 
overcome, in our view, some methodological weaknesses. 
2008) and Best for Working Mothers (Hannon & Milkovich, 1996) data have been 
published yearly. Additional rankings which are investigated by Hannon and 
Milkovich (1996) had been published just once (100 Best to Work for - 1984; Best for 
Women - 1988 & Best for Black Engineers - 1989) or twice (Best for Blacks - 1982 & 
1986) during the period of interest. 
Due to the fact that various event dates are sufficient respectively necessary for an 
event study to minimize external effects (Binder, 1985), the statistical power and 
informative value of the results is reduced to a large extend regarding the three 
rankings published just once.  
In principle, despite various research questions and respondents, all rankings which 
are used in the studies have the potential to cause announcement effects due to the 
disclosure of non-public information as explained earlier. Only, regarding the 
quarterly announcements of ACSI data, one could suppose that the effects tend to be 
very small. This would be attributable to the short time span between two 
announcements. Thus, it is less likely that the expectations of investors differ widely 
to change the buying intentions.  
In order to test for announcement effects we used the same methodology - an event 
study - as Hannon and Milkovich (1996), Fornell et al. (2006) and Abraham et al. 
(2008) have done. Nevertheless, there are considerable methodical differences 
between the studies which could lead to diverging results. From our point of view, the 
most important difference is how events are defined in the respective studies. These 
definitions are crucial to select and group the companies. 
Hannon and Milkovich (1996) defined the event as publication of a human resource 
ranking. Consequently, all companies which are listed in the ranking and publically 
tradable were grouped and tested. Contrary to this, Abraham et al. (2008) defined the 
event as listed in a specific quartile if the RQ are published. This definition takes into 
account the relative position of a company in comparison to the competitors. 
Therefore, the companies are grouped in correspondence to its quartiles and tested 
over all rankings. In our opinion, the problem of both event definitions is that they 
neglect the necessity of a changed (relative or absolute) position of companies. 
Without any change, there is no need for investors to revalue share prices. 
In line with this argument, Fornell et al. (2006) defined the event as the publication of 
a changed ACSI scores. That means they studied the impact of changed reputation 
scores in a ranking like we do. However, Fornell et al. (2006) have considered just an 
absolute change of scores what is not a sufficient indicator, in our view, for an 
improved or declined competitive position. Consequently, we choose a dynamic 
perspective which considers the relative changes in the reputation measure in 
comparison to both the previous ranking and the overall mean. 
A comparison of the event window definitions shows that all studies used primarily 
the period of publication (   ) and some additional event windows of maximum 5 
units of time (     to    ). Only Abraham et al. (2008) were gone beyond that 
and used an additional window of 250 days to make their results more comparable to 
the study of Anderson and Smith (2006). The criticism towards such a long event 
window and, accordingly, towards Anderson and Smith’s study (2006) is the same 
(see McWilliams & Siegel, 1997) which has led us to limit our event windows to a 
maximum of 3 days. 
The estimation windows of all analyses are differently defined as well in length, of 12 
respectively 6 months (Hannon & Milkovich, 1996), of 255 trading days (Fornell et al., 
2006) and 100 trading days (Abraham et al., 2008) as in its position in time. For 
example, Fornell et al. (2006) used a gap between estimation and event window of 
46 days. Whereas Abraham et al. (2008) used a gap of 100 trading days to ensure 
that the estimated parameters are not influenced by the event itself. Even if it is 
common practice to use such a gap, its completely arbitrary definition offers an 
opportunity to influence the results. This potential effect is partially visible if one 
compares the excess returns of our results and the additional provided control 
window (     to    ) at     (0.383 compared to 0.490). To avoid such effects 
we consciously renounce for any gap. With regard to the various lengths of 
estimation windows, we are of the opinion that the impact can be neglected as long 
as the period is long (     ).  
Furthermore, variations of calculating actual ex-post returns could be another 
potential cause for diverging results.  Hannon and Milkovich (1996) and Fornell et al. 
(2006) used discrete returns. In contrast to, Abraham et al. (2008) used log 
transformed returns as we do. However, based on the choice of Hannon and 
Milkovich (1996) to use monthly returns, one could fundamentally question if those 
returns are appropriate to test for announcement effects. Finally, it is almost 
impossible to isolate an effect due to the event in such aggregated data. 
Besides the event definition, another very important factor is the selection of a market 
model. But, all studies, including this one, used the classical CAPM as market model. 
However, in opposition to Hannon and Milkovich (1996) and Fornell et al. (2006) who 
have estimated the parameter   as intercept, which corresponds to      in our model 
(see equation 8), Abraham et al. (2008) have set   to be zero. The   parameter, as a 
risk measure in comparison to the market, is estimated in all studies except the study 
of Abraham et al. (2008). Abraham et al. (2008) set   to be 1, which implies that all 
companies are equally risky and risky as the entire market. That is not in line with 
finance theory.  
To put it in a nutshell, we believe that not the various used rankings but rather 
methodological differences are attributable to the absence of event studies which 
could validate announcement effects when reputation rankings are published. 
Nevertheless, in order to show an effect resulting from corporate reputation, the data 
should fulfill some basic criteria. According to Bromley (2002a) data should not be 
colluded due to sector membership of respondents and not be biased by financially 
focused criteria. In conformity with Schwaiger (2004), both criteria are fulfilled by 
Manager Magazin data. This also holds true for ACSI data used by Fornell et al. 
(2006) and all reputation rankings used by Hannon and Milkovich (1996). The 
suitability of RQ data (Abraham et al., 2008) can be questioned (Schwaiger, 2004), 
whereas the Fortune data used by Anderson and Smith (2006) are inappropriate with 
respect to these criteria (Bromley, 2002a). 
 
7. Limitations and further research 
Our study is limited to some extent. With regard to the underlying methodology, we 
have strong assumptions about the capital market and its information efficiency. In 
addition, as criticized by Bromley (2002a), our results are restricted to publicly traded 
companies.  
Furthermore, there are limitations with respect to the data. On the one hand, we are 
restricted to available data. On the other hand, a selection bias might exist induced 
by the choice of respondents. But following our line of argument including the 
assumptions, the used stakeholder group should be suitable to provide the 
information for “all” stakeholders. Consequently, the arguments that managers and 
directors are overrepresented (Bromley, 2002a) and revealing just incidental 
knowledge about stakeholders due to the influence of corporate communications 
(Schwaiger, Raithel & Schloderer, 2009), can be neglected. All stakeholders are 
influenced by corporate communication. 
Therefore, in order to clarify the general presence of announcement effects by 
publishing reputation rankings, additional research needs to be conducted but with 
different data. Moreover, in future research, the relative character (in comparison to 
the competitors) of the reputation construct should be considered, as well as that 
events have to trigger a revaluation of share prices. For this purpose, it is appropriate 
to adopt our methodological design. 
 
Appendix  
List of variables  
   Shareholder value    Cash flow 
  return   Time index 
  Company index      Discrete return of company   at time   
     Price of company   at time        Return of company   at time   
     Secure (fix) return at time         Market return at time   
   Abnormal return   ̅̅ ̅̅  averaged abnormal return 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Cumulative averaged abnormal 
return 
 (     
 ) Normal distribution with expected 
value   and variance   
   Error term of company      Estimated parameter of company   




Lists of up- and downgraded companies and their corresponding changes (differences of the relative 
positions in comparison to the previous year) which are contained in the final sample  
 Upgraded 
2000 Allianz 4,2% Deutsche Bank 6,8% Linde 4,9% 
MG Technologies 6,8% Münchener Rück 4,0% Porsche 4,8% 
SAP 5,1%     
2002 BMW 4,1% Deutsche Post 16,4% Bayer. Hypo-  & 
Vereinsbank 
7,2% 
Münchener Rück 4,8% Stinnes 6,5%   
2004 Adidas 4,8% Bayer 5,4% Beiersdorf 4,8% 
Henkel 5,0% Puma 16,8% TUI 5,9% 
United Internet 6,8%     
2006 Adidas 4,3% Deutsche Post 7,1% Deutsche Telekom 4,4% 
Fraport 5,2% Gea Group 5,2% Heidelberger 
Cement 
13,0% 
MAN 4,6% Mobilcom 10,8% Münchener Rück 4,3% 
Puma 5,3% United Internet 5,6%   
2008 Arcandor 7,4% Commerzbank 7,8% Daimler 5,0% 
Deutsche Bank 4,1% Gea Group 5,7% Bilfinger Berger 5,3% 
Heidelberger Druck 10,9% Hochtief 7,9% Linde 5,3% 
Thyssen Krupp 4,4% Volkswagen 9,0%   
 
 Downgraded 
2000 Hoechst -6,2% Siemens -4,6%   
2002 BASF -5,1% Bayer -11,7% Commerzbank -4,6% 
 Daimler -5,4% Deutsche Bank -6,4% Deutsche Telekom -10,9% 
 Philipp Holzmann -26,0% Mobilcom -11,9% SAP  
 Sixt -6,7%     
2004 Allianz -5,4% Commerzbank -10,7% Deutsche Bank -12,9% 
 Deutsche Post -7,0% Deutsche Telekom -4,4% Heidelberger Druck -8,4% 
 Heidelberger Cement -7,3% Bayer. Hypo-  & 
Vereinsbank 
-14,1% MLP -11,2% 
 Mobilcom -13,8% Münchener Rück -8,4% Volkswagen -4,7% 
2006 Arcandor -28,3% Daimler -20,5% EON -12,9% 
 Heidelberger Druck -4,4% Infineon -5,1% RWE -12,5% 
 Siemens -8,5% Volkswagen -17,9%   
2008 Allianz -7,0% BASF -4,2% BMW -5,0% 
 Deutsche Post -4,4% Deutsche Telekom -15,6% EON -9,3% 
 Fresenius Medical 
Care 
-5,1% Metro -4,4% ProSiebenSat.1 
Media 
-5,2% 
 MTU Aero Engines -4,8% Porsche -4,8% Puma -6,7% 
 RWE -7,4% Siemens -12,7% TUI -5,2% 
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